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Few v. Few' was an action for the partition of a large farm
tract in Williamsburg County. On this tract was an expensive
house which was occupied by the defendant, Marion Few, as his
home. The referee and circuit judge allotted the house to the
defendant at a valuation of 25,000 dollars. The referee found
that the remaining property could be divided in kind, but recom-
mended nonetheless that it be sold. The circuit court found that
the property could be divided in kind, and accordingly ordered
that it be so divided by commissioners in partition. The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed and ordered that the property,
including the house, be sold at public sale. The case deserves close
attention to determine whether it pronounces any new rule or
presents any new tendency in the law of partition.
Although the parties to the action are Carolyn Few and
Marion Few, all of the transactions in dispute took place be-
tween Carolyn's husband, Ben Few, and the defendant. The farm
had been operated for a number of years by Marion, the de-
fendant, but Ben had furnished all of the money except for the
amount Marion put into the construction of the house. The action
was for an accounting as well as for a partition, and much of
the testimony concerned the financial transactions between the
brothers. These were dishearteningly confusing. The referee's
distaste for this fraternal muddle lead him to refuse to decide
most of the disputed facts, so that his report contains virtually
no findings. Instead, its conclusions are based on the referee's
general impressions of the case, and the order of the circuit court
dealt with the case in this same fashion. The resulting lack of
factual and conceptual clarity, while probably dictated by the
circumstances of the case, must have hindered the supreme court
from deciding the case in a more forthright and direct manner.
The first question as presented for decision may be subdivided
into two parts: (a) Did the court err in allotting the dwelling
to the defendant, and (b) was the valuation placed on the dwell-
ing in error? The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
court erred in alloting the dwelling to the defendant. In holding
this it considered the difficulties of placing a proper valuation
* Attorney, Greenville, S. C.
1. 242 S.C. 433, 131 S.E.2d 248 (1963).
1
Townes: Property
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH: CtoLiA LAW REVw
on the dwelling. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not
reverse the concurrent finding of the referee and the circuit judge
that the market value of the dwelling was 25,000 dollars. The
valuation of the dwelling is not discussed in the opinion for the
purpose of arriving at a new and different value. Rather, the
assigned valuation is taken as given, but the assignment of the
dwelling to the defendant at that value is found to be inequitable.
The South Carolina Supreme Court first emphasized that the
defendant, Marion Few, was not in the position of a co-tenant
who was entitled to reimbursement or to the allotment of an
improved portion of the property by reason of having himself
made improvements. Neither the referee nor the circuit court
found that the defendant had paid more than his share of the
57,000 dollars which the house had cost to build. The failure of
the referee to make this finding was not an oversight, and it
should not be assumed that the referee made this finding by
implication. As stated above, the referee with evident intention
refrained from reaching a decision as to any of the financial
transactions between the parties. The South Carolina Supreme
Court's statement that the defendant was not in the position of
an improving tenant was completely justified. The referee al-
lotted the dwelling to the defendant not because he was an im-
proving tenant, but because the house had been constructed as a
home for him; his own home had been sold; he had moved to the
house; and he was living in it, all with the prior knowledge and
consent of the plaintiff. The referee concluded that under these
circumstances equity demanded that the house be allotted to the
defendant.
There is a rule of partition that an allotment of a portion of
property may be made to a co-tenant on general equitable prin-
ciples, and circumstances such as those considered by the referee
are not without importance. 2 An example of allotment of im-
proved property made on general equitable principles to a co-
tenant who was not entitled to claim as an "improving tenant"
may be found in the case of Guignard v. Oorley.3 In the
Guignard case the co-tenant receiving the allotment of an im-
proved portion of the land had originally constructed the im-
provements as a trespasser. He had then acquired an interest
in the property, but he had no right to claim as an "improving
tenant" the improvements which he had made as a trespasser.
2. Lewis v. Sellick, 69 Tex. 379, 7 S.W. 673 (1887).
3. 147 S.C. 12, 144 S.E. 586 (1928).
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After considering the circumstances and the law the court held:
The logical result of the foregoing conclusions would be to
deny the Guignard estate all compensation for the cost and
value of the improvements placed upon the strips occupied
by the spur tracks; but it does not necessarily follow that
the Court would not have the power to allot these particular
strips to the estate under all the circumstances....
The court added:
The situation is peculiar, and strongly appeals to the Court
to exercise its great chancery powers to order what is equit-
able and just.4
It appeared that were any other person to obtain these improve-
ments it would give such other person a strangle hold on certain
spur tracks which were vital to the business being operated by
Guignard. Therefore the improvements were allotted to the
Guignard estate upon payment into court of their value.
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the
referee had based his decision on general equitable principles
rather than on the proposition that the defendant was entitled to
have the house allotted to him as an improving tenant, and stated,
"We recognize the broad authority conferred upon the court to
partition in kind or by allotment."
Why then did the court devote so much space to the discussion
of the doctrine of an "improving tenant" 2 While it seems evident
that the referee came to his decision on general equitable prin-
ciples, he made no explicit reference to his theory of the case.
The order of the circuit judge goes beyond the referee's report
and refers to the fact (which the referee did not mention) that
the defendant testified that the plaintiff had contributed 14,000
dollars to the construction of the 57,000 dollar house. (Note that
the circuit judge did not find this to be the case, but merely
referred to the defendant's testimony.) The circuit judge then
quoted the case of Tedder v. Tedder5 and this is the only case
cited in the respondent's brief on the question of the propriety
of allotting the dwelling to the defendant. The case of Tedder v.
Tedder involves an improving tenant. This doctrine was the
explicit basis of the decision of the circuit court and was argued
by the respondent on appeal. Consequently, it was incumbent
upon the South Carolina Supreme Court to devote attention to it.
4. Id. at 26, 144 S.E. at 591.
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After pointing out that the defendant was not in the position
of an improving tenant, the South Carolina Supreme Court then
held that even if he had had such a claim, its disallowance would
not be inequitable to him nor would it unjustly enrich his co-
tenant. By agreement the defendant had managed the farm and
the plaintiff had furnished the money. The defendant had put
no money into the property except what he spent in the construc-
tion of the house. Under his own testimony this amounted to
some 43,000 dollars. The plaintiff had put in excess of 103,000
dollars net into the operation of the farm and improvements, and
had furnished the entire purchase price of the land. It was clear
that the expenditures of the plaintiff had been out of all pro-
portion to those of the defendant, and that she would not be
unjustly enriched by sharing in the defendant's contribution.
The most important aspect of the allotment of the house to
the defendant was the valuation placed on the house. Here the
testimony was conflicting, but the conflict was not over facts.
It was a conflict of opinion. The witnesses who appraised tle
house were divided into two factions, local witnesses and outside
experts. The local witnesses believed that the house would not
bring more than 25,000 dollars and based their appraisal on tle
local market. The outside experts believed that the house would
bring 40,000 dollars to 65,000 dollars and based their appraisal
on the supposition that the property could be sold to a non-resi-
dent man of wealth. The local witnesses were appraising a farm
house on a farm. The outside experts were appraising a residence
on a country estate.
The referee and the circuit judge adopted the value of the
house on the local market, and no doubt the local market is the
best measure of what the property might bring at public sale. It
-was undisputed that the replacement value of the house and its
real worth was around 65,000 dollars. The house had cost 57,000
dollars to build. It was evident that only by a fortunate sale
-would it be possible to realize the intrinsic value of the house.
Assuming that the house would not bring more than 25,000 dol-
lars at public sale, there would be a substantial loss, and the pur-
chaser would have a splendid bargain. Such a purchaser possibly
could obtain a 40,000 dollar profit in cash by a sale on that thin,
slow, affluent market for country estates which had been evoked
by the outside appraisers.
Had there been no such disparity between the local value of
the house and its intrinsic worth, or had the other market not
[Vol. 17
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existed, the allotment of the house to the defendant would not
have been disturbed. The allotment was set aside because of a
cardinal principle regarding all such allotments-that an allot-
ment must result in no inequity to the interests of the other
co-tenants. "It would be inequitable," the court held, "to bestow
this bargain upon one tenant at the expense of the other."0
There is no doubt that Marion Few would have gotten a bar-
gain in the house, but in what sense would his bargain be at the
expense of his co-tenant? What she had been deprived of in the
allotment of the house at this valuation was the right to bring
the property to a sale and obtain the bargain for herself or to
realize more for the property by competitive bidding. The court
could have cited with great effect the case of Moore v. William-
son.7 The opinion in that case is as follows:
It is equally a notorious practice in partition cases, that a
party dissatisfied with the rate at which land is recom-
mended to be assigned to another party, may shake the pro-
posed assignment, and bring the property to a sale by mak-
ing and securing a bid for a material advance in price over
the value assessed by the Commissioners. The Court would
not attend to an insignificant advance (since such a practice
would tend to hang up causes indefinitely, without sensibly
promoting the justice of cases), but wherever the advance
is for the substantial benefit of all the parties interested in
the partition, the Court is bound to attend to it.8
In the present case the court could have pointed out that the
relief offered by the rule in the Moore case had been overlooked
below and remanded the case to allow the plaintiff-appellant
the opportunity to secure a bid for a higher figure. Considering
the plaintiff's evident affluence and her claim that the property
was undervalued by 40,000 dollars, there was no doubt that she
was ready and willing to offer a "material advance in price."
This is implicit in the appeal itself. In this circumstance omission
of the intermediate step of the actual securing of a bid was
warranted.
It may be argued that this case goes beyond the Moore case.
If so, the modern rule would be that the court will order a sale
instead of alloting an improvement at an assigned valuation
6. Few v. Few, 242 S.C. 433, 442, 131 S.E.2d 248, 252 (1963).
7. 10 Rich. Eq. 323 (S.C. 1858).
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when (a) a substantial higher bid is obtained, or (b) there is a
reasonable possibility that the property may realize more than
its normal market value, or (c) the intrinsic worth of the prop-
erty substantially exceeds its market value.
One could shrug away all technicalities and say that the prop-
erty should be sold when it is inequitable to make an allotment
at market value. When we ask what this statement means we
return to the technical rules, although in equity there may always
occur the rare case that falls outside them.
The second issue for decision was whether the lower court
erred in directing that the property be divided in kind. The
testimony on this point showed the same conflict as the testi-
mony concerning the market value of the house. The local wit-
nesses, regarding the land as ordinary farming land, saw no
reason why it could not be divided in kind. The outside experts,
regarding the handsome house and large acreage as an estate,
believed that its value would be destroyed by subdivision into
smaller tracts. It would seem that each group was correct within
its frame of reference.
The decision of the referee and of the circuit judge that the
land could be divided in kind presupposed that the house would
be allotted separately to the defendant. They expressed no opin-
ion as to the propriety of this division in case of a sale of the
house at public auction. Much of the testimony on which the
decision below was based assumed that the house would be al-
lotted and not sold. The outside experts believed that a division
of the property in kind would especially impair the market value
of the house. The decision to auction the entire property was a
consequence of the decision to auction the house and was tech-
nically not a reversal of the finding of the referee and circuit
judge. The third issue in the case, a point of procedure, was
decided without discussion.
The case emphasizes certain considerations which infrequently
appear in partition suits at the appellate level, and the opinion
had to adapt itself to the posture of the case on appeal. It ap-
pears, however, that the decision is in conformity with the estab-
lished law regarding partition.
Must the grantee of a deed accept its delivery in order for title
to pass? The case of Branton v. Martin9 contains an important
discussion of this question. Sarah A. Branton had six children:
9. 243 S.C. 90, 132 S.E.2d 285 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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Sam, Essie, Leila, Alice, Maggie, and Laura. Mrs. Branton had
conveyed a lot to Laura in 1933. In February 1946 her son, Sam,
was visiting Mrs. Branton. In the presence of her daughter,
Maggie, with whom she lived, Mrs. Branton gave a paper to
Sam, saying, "Take care of it and keep it, it is for you children,
and Maggie knows about it, you may need it some day."'1 Sam,
without determining the contents of the document, gave it to his
sister, Laura, for safekeeping. This paper, as it developed, was
a deed bearing a date of January 8, 1946, conveying property to
all of the children except Laura. In August 1946 Mrs. Branton
made a deed of the same property to her daughter Maggie. The
deed of Mrs. Branton to the children was recorded in 1958. That
of Mrs. Branton to Maggie was recorded in 1951.
As presented on appeal the principal issue in the case was
whether the first deed had been accepted by the grantees, who
were ignorant of its contents at the time it was delivered and
for a considerable period thereafter. The doctrine that a deed
must be accepted in order to pass title is peculiar to American
law. At common law and in English law acceptance is not re-
quired although the grantee has a right to disclaim or repudiate
the deed. There has never been a South Carolina case where a
deed was held to be invalid for want of acceptance by the
grantee. The court indicates that it is prepared in a proper case
to abandon explicitly the dogma requiring acceptance of a deed
by its grantee. But this was unnecessary here in view of a gen-
erally recognized exception to the requirement of acceptance,
which is that where there is a voluntary conveyance which is
beneficial to the grantee the acceptance of the deed will be
presumed even though the grantee is ignorant of the terms of
the deed. A presumption of this nature is a tacit repudiation of
the rule. It is doubtful that a case will ever arise in which the
ghost of the doctrine of acceptance will be forever laid to rest.
The comments of the court bring this case within a hair's breadth
of doing so.
Also of interest in the present case is the proof of the execution
of the deed made by Mrs. Branton to her children. Mrs. Branton
could not write her name and her signature was evidenced by
an "X" mark. One of the subscribing witnesses identified his
signature on the deed, but had no recollection of the actual exe-
cution. The other subscribing witness denied that he had wit-
nessed the deed and denied his signature. The notary who took
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the probate also denied his signature. The master concluded that
the witness simply did not remember the transaction and
found that the deed had been properly executed and witnessed.
The circuit court concurred in this finding and the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court upheld it against the argument that the
conclusion below was against the greater weight of the evidence.
In upholding the conclusion, the decision makes reference to
the case of Hunt v. ,mith,"1 where one of the witnesses had died
before the trial and the other witness was living, but was not
produced. The husband of the grantor testified that the witnesses
did not see his wife sign and that he had taken the deed to each
of the witnesses and asked each of them to execute it. In the
Hunt case the court found that the oath of the witness before
the notary who took the probate gave rise to a presumption of
the truth of the facts recited in the probate. The lower court
was justified in finding that the testimony of the husband was
not sufficient to overcome this presumption. In the Hunt case
there was no doubt that the grantor of the deed had actually
executed it. In the present case the grantor could not write her
name and her signature was evidenced by an "X" mark. The
notary himself testified that he had not signed the deed. The
Hunt case is analogous in spirit, but only in spirit. In both cases
the lower court found that the disputed deed had been properly
executed and witnessed. It is not clear whether, had the lower
court held otherwise, the criteria adopted in these two cases would
have been used to overrule the finding below.
The case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Smoak12 construes a deed
given to the Southern Railway Company. The granting clause
was "unto the Railway Company" and omitted the words "suc-
cessors and assigns." The habendum of the deed was as follows:
To have and to hold the said premises unto The Railway
Company, its successors and assigns, as a right of way for
use for railroad purposes so long as it or they may require
the said right of way for the operation, maintenance and
repair of said industrial spur track.
Upon condition, however, that in the event that Railroad
Company should abandon the said industrial spur track and
in evidence thereof should discontinue the operation of the
same and remove its property and fixtures therefrom and
from the way appurtenant thereto, then and in such event
11. 202 S.C. 129, 24 S.E.2d 164 (1943).
12. 243 S.C. 331, 133 S.E.2d 806 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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the said parcel of land hereby conveyed shall revert to the
parties of the first part, their successors and assigns.1'
The rule at common law and that generally in force is that the
words "successors and assigns" are not necessary to convey a
fee simple to a corporation aggregate (as distinguished from a
corporation sole). There has been no South Carolina case on
this point, but the present case settles the question for all prac-
tical purposes.
It was the position of the railway that the granting clause
placed in it a fee simple absolute title. Since the granting clause,
as the plaintiff claimed, gave it a fee simple absolute, the estate
so granted could not be cut down by subsequent language in the
habendum, in accordance with the well known rule to this effect.
This outrageously ingenious sophistry failed. Under the plain-
tiff's theory, how could one possibly grant a limited estate to
a corporation? The rule that provides that words of succession
are not necessary to give a corporation a fee simple title also
provides that in the absence of such words the general intent of
the deed may be considered in determining what estate was con-
veyed. The court assumes for the purpose of the decision that
South Carolina recognizes the rule that words of succession are
not necessary to place a fee simple absolute title in a corporation.
The court then held:
Assuming, without deciding, that the stated rule applies
in this State, the present deed falls within a recognized ex-
ception. This exception is set forth in Restatement of the
Law of Property, Section 34, page 96, as follows:
An estate in fee simple absolute is created in a cor-
poration aggregate by an otherwise effective conveyance
inter vivos of land without the use of words of succes-
sion, unless an intent is expressed in the conveyance to
create an estate other than an estate in fee simple ab-
solute. (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing exception, applicable here, may be stated
to be that the omission of words of succession from the grant-
ing clause in a deed to a corporation aggregate is indicative
of an intent to convey an estate less than a fee simple abso-
lute, when the habendum shows a clear intent to convey a
lesser estate. This does not state a novel rule of construction,
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but is simply the application to the present deed of long
settled principles of law.14
This decision is obviously right. Although the case does not hold
that South Carolina recognizes the rule that words of succession
are not necessary to give a corporation a fee simple title, there
can remain little doubt that this doctrine will be accepted by the
court.
In the case of the PeopZes Nat'l Bank v. Hable'15 a testator had
created a life estate in trust for the benefit of an invalid daugh-
ter. The remainder was given to the testator's wife and another
daughter, or to the survivor of the two. Unexpectedly both of
the remaindermen predeceased the life tenant. The problem faced
by the court was what happened to the remainder. The terms of
the will of lyman Endel which gave rise to this controversy, are
as follows:
12TH: The remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the residue of my
estate I will, bequeath and devise unto my wife Frances
Endel and my daughter, Hortense Reisenfeld, in trust for
the following purposes to invest said portion of my estate in
income bearing securities and to pay over the income arising
therefrom to my daughter Bernice Endel during the period
of her natural lifetime and at her death then to divide said
share of said residue equally between my said wife and my
said daughter Iortense; in the event that either should die
before said time for the division of said portion of the resi-
due of my estate, then I give, bequeath and devise the share
of such deceased one to the survivor of the two. In order to
provide the income for my daughter Bernice I hereby give
to the said trustees full power and authority to sell the said
securities or any part thereof from time to time as they may
think best and to reinvest the proceeds thereof in other in-
come bearing securities, giving also full power to make re-
sales of such securities as often as may be and whenever
necessary for the same purpose.
13TH1: For the purpose of making division of the residue
of my property as hereinabove provided, I direct my Execu-
tors to have all my property, both real and personal, ap-
praised by three disinterested persons, and that the bene-
ficiaries of said residue shall have the right by agreement
14. Id. at 335-336, 133 S.E.2d at 808.
15. 243 S.C. 502, 134 S.E.2d 763 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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to divide said property and securities among themselves in
the proportions hereinabove set forth and if said benefici-
aries are unable to agree upon such division, I direct my
Executrices to sell said property including real estate and
such securities, and to divide the proceeds as hereinabove set
forth; after the death of my daughter Bernice, I desire the
division of the property devised and bequeathed in trust for
her to be made in the same way, Mrs. Endel and Hortense
sharing equally therein, and if only one survive she to take
the entire interest.16
Frances Endel, the widow, died in 1937 and Hortense Reisen-
feld, the other remainderman, died in 1958. Bernice Endel sur-
vived both and died in 1959. Frances Endel was the testator's
third wife and there were no children of that marriage. Hortense
and Bernice were the children of a second marriage and the only
children of the testator. Hortense had devised her property to
an unrelated individual. As a result there were three distinct
groups of claimants. The principal contentions of the various
parties as set forth in the agreed statement in the transcript
were as follows:
(1) The remainder was contingent, the vesting of same
being conditioned on the remaindermen surviving the life
tenant.
(2) The remainder was vested subject to divestment upon
the failure of either remainderman to survive the life tenant.
(3) The remainder was vested jointly, each one-half in-
terest being subject to divestment by executory devise upon
the death of either remainderman prior to the termination
of the life estate and in favor of the survivor of the two
remaindermen, said survivor not having to survive the life
tenant in order to take the entire remainder interest ab-
solutely.
(4) The remainder was vested, each one-half interest
being subject to divestment by executory devise upon the
death of either remainderman prior to the termination of
the life estate, but only if the surviving remainderman also
survived the life tenant.
The distinction between contention 2 and contentions 3 and 4
may not be readily apparent. This distinction arises from the
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attempt to invoke the case of Blount v. Walker'7 which will be
discussed below.
The master held that the remainder interest devised to the
testator's wife and to his daughter, Hortense, did not become
vested at the death of the testator but was contingent upon the
remaindermen surviving the life tenant. He thus concluded that
the trust property should go as intestate property to the testator's
heirs at law determined at the time of his death. The circuit
court reversed the master. The order of Judge McFadden held
that upon the death of the testator, his wife, Frances, and daugh-
ter, Hortense, "took a vested remainder in the one-fourth residue
of his estate, subject to alternative divestment between them; 'in
the event that either should die before said time for the division
of said portion of the residue of my estate' leaving 'either' (one
or the other) as 'the survivor of the two,' if such event occurred,
only then, 'if only one survived, she to take the entire inter-
est.' ,,8
The theory of the circuit court, therefore, was that Frances and
Hortense were each the owner of a vested one-half interest in
remainder. If either (not both) of them died before Bernice
leaving the other surviving at the time of the distribution, then
the living remainderman was to take all. Since both died before
Bernice the gift over did not take effect, and the property was
left as an indefeasibly vested interest in each remainderman.
Consequently those claiming through Frances and those claiming
through Hortense each were entitled to a one-half interest in the
trust property.
The position of the master embraced "contention 1" and that of
the circuit judge embraced "contention 4." The South Carolina
Supreme Court adopted "contention 3," and held that once Hor-
tense had survived Frances the remainder was irrevocably vested
in her, so that her devisee took the whole trust property. The
contention that the remainder was contingent was argued with
great ability and effect by two distinguished firms of attorneys.
Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the remainder interests were
not contingent, but were vested remainders subject to divestment.
The considerations which apply to cases like these have been
discussed time and again. The provision that if either of the
remaindermen predeceased the life tenant the share of the de-
17. 31 S.C. 13, 6 S.E. 558 (1888).
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ceased one should go to the survivor of the two is a type of gift
which is universally construed as an executory devise. The con-
dition on which the gift is made is called a condition subsequent,
to distinguish it from a condition precedent which would give
rise to a contingent remainder. Gifts made in this form are com-
mon. They are to be distinguished from gifts to named remain-
dermen "then surviving" or similar words which explicitly
require that remaindermen be living at the death of the life ten-
ant in order to take any interest at all. The fact that there is a
gift over under certain conditions to the survivor of the two
remaindermen creates no legal implication that the remainder
was contingent in the first instance. The words of survivorship
are used only in reference to the gift over, not in reference to
the original gift in remainder. Even though we may reasonably
assume that in his own mind the testator did not anticipate that
both remaindermen would die before the life tenant, this does not
affect the vested character of the remainder. The objective mean-
ing of the words he used and the legal intent of his will was to
vest the remainder at the time of his death, without the require-
ment that the remaindermen survive the life tenant in order to
take. The court disposed of the contention that the remainders
were contingent by reference to the usual authorities, which will
not be repeated here.
What may be confusing to an attorney unaccustomed to this
field of practice is what happens when there is a gift over to a
survivor and there is no survivor to receive the gift. The answer
is very simple. Nothing happens. If there is no survivor, the gift
over does not take place. The absolute estate first given can be
defeated only where the limitation over can take effect.19 When
the Endel will is considered in this light, it is apparent that the
remainder was vested either in Hortense or jointly in Hortense
and in Frances. The choice between these alternatives must be
based upon the determination of the intention of the testator as
expressed in this particular will.
The South Carolina Supreme Court refers to a series of cases
in which similar testamentary provisions have been construed as
requiring survivorship only of the other remainderman under
factual circumstances resembling those in the present case. To
this list should be added the case of In re Moore's Estate.20 It is
the holding of all of the cases that the phrase "survivors of
19. Perry v. Logan, 5 Rich. Eq. 202 (S.C. 1853).
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them" or "survivor of the two," referring to survivorship be-
tween remaindermen, does not give rise to the implication that
the survivor of the remaindermen must also be surviving at the
termination of the life estate. But if there are other words in the
will which do express such a requirement, they will be duly con-
sidered and the limitation over will then be given effect only
if the survivor is living at the termination of the life estate.
There are cases similar to the one at hand where such an intent
was found to exist.
2'1
Kersh v. Yongue involved a deed which contained the follow-
ing language:
[T] hat at and after the death of my said daughter, the said
(trustee) shall convey, release and confirm unto the four
present children of my said daughter, or the survivor or
survivors of them, in equal shares, as tenants in common, the
absolute right and title in and to all the above mentioned
property, both real and personal, together with the increase
thereof, and to their heirs forever.
22
All four children died before the life tenant, and the issue in the
case was whether the property reverted to the estate of the
grantor or whether it was vested, and thus transmissible to the
children's distributees. In holding that the remainder was vested
and transmissible to the children's distributees the court also held
that the remainder was held in equal shares by the estates of the
four deceased children.
The words of the Kersh deed, "unto the four present children
of my said daughter, or to the survivor or survivors of them,"
2 3
are superficially similar to the words in the Endel will "to the
survivor of the two."2 4 In the Kersh deed, however, it is obvious
that the time referred to is the death of the life tenant, and that
what is required is survival of the life tenant and not of some
other remainderman. In the Endel will the language in Item 12
contemplates only the survival of one remainderman by the
other remainderman, for the language reads "in the event that
21. Kersh v. Yongue, 7 Rich. Eq. 100 (S.C. 1854); Belk v. Slack, 1 Keen
238, 48 Eng. Rep. 297 (1836) ; Browne v. Lord Kenyon, 3 Madd. 410, 56 Eng.
Rep. 556 (1818) ; Harrison v. Foreman, 5 Vesey Jr. 207, 31 Eng. Rep. 549
(1800) ; In re Pickworth's Estate, 1 Ch. 642 (1899).
22. Kersh v. Yongue, 7 Rich. Eq. 100 (S.C. 1854).
23. Ibid.
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either should die before said time for the division of said portion
of the residue of my estate.1
25
The circuit court regarded the provision in Item 13 of the will,
which stated "After the death of my daughter, Bernice, I desire
the division of the property devised and bequeathed in trust for
her to be made in the same way, Mrs. Endel and Hortense shar-
ing equally therein, and if only one survives then she to take the
entire interest,"26 as constituting a clear expression by the tes-
tator of an additional intent to require the survivor to be living
at the date of the death of the life tenant in order to receive the
gift over of the other one-half remainder interest. This language
enlarged and explained the intention expressed in Item 12. The
South Carolina Supreme Court, however, dismissed this lan-
guage as surplusage and found that Item 13 was not intended to
be dispositive. This being the case there was nothing in Item 12
which would give rise to the requirement that for the gift over
to take effect the survivor must be living at the death of the life
tenant. The court therefore held that Hortense, who was the sur-
vivor of the two remaindermen, was indefeasibly vested with the
entire remainder.
The writer represented those who claimed the interest of
Frances Endel. It was my contention that the will should be con-
strued as a whole and that the provisions of Item 13, quoted
above, demonstrated that the testator intended that the survivor,
in order to take, must be living at the death of the life tenant.
The construction of a will of this type is a matter of delicate
judgment, and the decision of the court is not demonstrably in
error. The writer assumes that it is the bias resulting from his
long advocacy of the other position that leads him to feel that
the manner in which the South Carolina Supreme Court dis-
missed the language in Item 13 was rather cavalier.
The position described as "contention 2" was an attempt to
argue that there was a defeasance as to the interest of both re-
maindermen in favor of the testator's heirs determined as of the
date of the death of the life tenant, Bernice (the date of the
termination of the trust). This proposition appears ridiculous on
its face, but had a more plausible basis than might be expected.
There is a curious case, Blount v. Valker,27 where upon the
failure of all contingent remainders in a testamentary trust the
25. Id. at 507, 134 S.E.2d at 765.
26. Ibid.




Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH CARoLiA LAw REvImW
reversion was held to go to the heirs at law of the testator de-
termined as of the termination of the trust. It is doubtful that
Blount v. Walker would be followed at the present time even in
a case resembling it more closely than did this one, and the court
chose to ignore it in the present opinion.
In the case of Connor v. Farmers & Aerchants Bank,28 the
plaintiff, an elderly woman, rented an apartment. The landlord
undertook to repair a brick floor on the premises, and due to the
use of defective mortar in these repairs crevices developed be-
tween the bricks. The plaintiff, momentarily distracted by the
escape of her pet parakeet, caught the heel of her shoe in one of
these cracks and fell, sustaining serious injuries. It was alleged
and proven to the satisfaction of the jury that the landlord had
been negligent in the manner in which the brick floor was re-
paired.
The decision noted that in the absence of contract a landlord
is under no duty to make repairs, while if a contract to repair
exists the liability of a landlord for the failure to make repairs
is limited to an action for breach of a contract. However, where
the landlord actually undertakes to make repairs and does so in
a negligent fashion he may be held liable in tort for injuries
resulting from his negligence. The decision holds: "Negligence
on the part of the lessor in making repairs or improvements is
regarded as an act of misfeasance, subjecting him to tort liability
for any resulting damages."
29
The homestead exemption is not a shield against obligations
contracted for the erection or making of improvements or repairs
on the homestead itself.30 The case of Brookline Say. & Trust Co.
v. Barnett3l involves this gap in the homestead exemption. The
Barnetts entered into a contract with American Veneering Com-
pany for new siding on their house. They executed a note for
these improvements. The note contemplated assignment to Brook-
line Savings and Trust Company, a Pennsylvania company, and
it was so assigned. To effect adjustments in payments the Bar-
netts executed two subsequent notes to Brookline which were des-
ignated as "revision notes," and which said in clear language
that the holder's original rights were to remain unimpaired.
Upon default in payment Brookline obtained a judgment in
28. 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
29. Id. at 139-140, 132 S.E.2d at 388.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-62 (1962).
31. 243 S.C. 481, 134 S.E2d 569 (1964).
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Pennsylvania against the Barnetts under a provision in the notes
which gave it the right to do so. Suit was then brought upon
this judgment in York County.
Section 34-62 of the Code3 2 provides that prior to levy upon a
homestead under the statute a certification by the court must be
obtained that the origin of the judgment was for one of the pur-
poses which are stated to be superior to the homestead. The suit
therefore asked that the court declare the Pennsylvania judg-
ment to be a judgment in South Carolina, and that the court
certify that the judgment was a lien upon that realty of the
debtors which they claimed as a homestead.
It was the position of the defendants that the judgment was
not for an obligation contracted for making of improvements or
repairs upon the homestead, but was merely a judgment upon a
promissory note held by one who furnished no materials or labor
for such improvements, and moreover that a judgment on a
renewal note could not be enforced against the homestead.
The court based its decision upon the general law of homestead
as.contained in Corpus Juris Secundum and cases cited therein.
Obligations for purchase money or for improvements on the
homestead may be freely assigned, without losing their special
character. Likewise the character of such an obligation is not
changed by a renewal note, even though it may be for a different
amount or a different rate of interest from the original obliga-
tion. Brookline was therefore entitled to levy against the home-
stead.
The court cites as South Carolina authority All v. Goodson88
where an improvement on the homestead was furnished by a
company through a commissioned agent. The debtor paid the
company its part and gave the agent a note for his commission.
The agent was allowed to collect the note against the homestead
on the grounds that it represented part of the cost of improve-
ment on the homestead. The court considers the agent's note in
the All case as constituting, in effect, an assignment of part of
the debt by the company to the agent. On this basis the court
regarded the question of the assignment of such an obligation as
already settled in South Carolina. It might be mentioned that
there is another case, White v. Barberry,34 involving levy against
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-62 (1962).
33. 33 S.C. 229, 11 S.E. 703 (1900).
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homestead under section 34-62.1 of the Code" which appears
also to be good precedent. This section of the code provides that
advances for materials used in farming on the homestead shall
be collectible from crops produced on the homestead. A landlord
endorsed his tenant's fertilizer note, and in due time was required
to pay it. He took an assignment of the note, and as assignee he
sued the tenant. It was held that the landlord was entitled to
recover on the note against the tenant's homestead as one making
agricultural advances. (The crops themselves had been set off
as homestead, although the land was rented-not homestead land.
The effect of the assignment was the question in the case.)
Real Property Cases Decided on Facts
Allen v. Grimsley3" is an action for breach of a general war-
ranty in a deed. The issue in the case was a factual one-whether
a real estate agent, who had accepted the down payment on
property and failed to apply it to the satisfaction of the mort-
gage, was the seller's agent or the purchaser's agent. There is
nothing in the case of interest beyond the factual issues involved.
In the case of Burrell v. Kirkland3 7 the plaintiff's right to use
a "field road" crossing property of the defendants was at issue.
The per curiam opinion adopts the decree of the circuit judge.
The decree presents the case in a clear and logical fashion, and
presents good citations on each of the points involved. The case
itself was decided on the facts and the opinion contains nothing
of note.
The case of Dargan v. Metropolitan Properties, Inc.38 was an
appeal from a foreclosure action. The mortgagor had attempted
to show that it would be inequitable to allow the mortgagee to
accelerate the balance due under a note and to bring foreclosure.
The court held that the mortgagor had failed to prove sufficient
facts to warrant equitable interference with the mortgagee's
right to foreclose the mortgage. The case contains no reference
of note to any legal principles.
The cases of Hall v. Senn3 9 and Allen v. Georqia Industrial
Realty 00.40 were both won in the lower court on defenses of
35. S.C. CODE ANrN. § 34-62.1 (1962).
36. 243 S.C. 398, 134 S.E.2d 211 (1964).
37. 242 S.C. 201, 130 S.E.2d 470 (1963).
38. 243 S.C. 324, 133 S.E.2d 821 (1963).
39. 242 S.C. 544, 131 S.E.2d 700 (1963).
40. 242 S.C. 472, 131 S.E.2d 419 (1963).
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estoppel and laches. The briefs in both appeals attempted to raise
interesting questions as to the applicability of these defenses, but
in each case the court rather saw fit to affirm on the grounds of
the appellant's procedural ineptitudes. Although in the Hall case
the court reviewed the testimony, the decision does not seriously
consider the points made in the appellant's brief and rests on the
failure of the crucial exception to contain any specification of
error. In the Allen case the statement of questions involved in the
appellant's brief failed to put in issue the defense of estoppel,
although proper exception had been taken and the matter was
argued in the brief.
The cases should serve as a warning to those whose positions
are strong on law but weak on equity. There is no one whose
rights are held in less regard by an appellate court than the liti-
gant who has lost his case by laches or estoppel. The mercy shown
by equity goes only to the winner; the loser, at the expense of
whose legal rights equity has done its justice, is made to seem
contemptible.
Zoning and Permit Cases
In the case of Bob Jones Univ. v. City of Greenville41 one
hears but the echo of a controversy which was vigorously and
stridently waged in court and elsewhere.
The city of Greenville zoned for business a residential buffer
strip which had heretofore existed between Bob Jones Univer-
sity and commercial properties. Both the master in equity and the
circuit judge concluded that the evidence failed to show that the
re-zoning was arbitrary, unreasonable or an abuse of discretion
on the part of city council. When the South Carolina Supreme
Court accepted these concurrent findings it disposed of most of
the issues of the case. The university raised the issue of spot zon-
ing. Since the effect of the amendment of the ordinance was to
expand an existing zone this contention was rejected.
A more serious question, and one which evoked a well written
dissent, related to the failure of the master to rule on objections
to testimony and to contain in his report a statement of precisely
what testimony he had considered in arriving at his findings.
The master had failed to follow the procedure described in sec-
tion 10-1409 of the Code4 2 during the hearing, and in his report
did nothing to correct this error. It has not been the custom of
41. 243 S.C. 351, 133 S.E.2d 843 (1963).




Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH: CAioLiNA LAW REvimw
the master in Greenville County to follow this code section. In
the normal case this practice creates no great hardship upon those
attorneys which may wish to appeal, but in a case involving
voluminous testimony and exhibits and numerous objections it
becomes impossible to determine to what extent the master's con-
clusions may be based upon inadmissible testimony. While the
court found that the master's failure to observe the statutory
mandate was not prejudicial to the appellant, one cannot help
but notice that the appellant did, after all, lose the case on the
facts found by the master, by whatever testimony these may
have been established.
Lominick v. City of Aiken48 involves a fickle building permit.
Under the zoning ordinance of the city of Aiken property lo-
cated in a "P" zone may be used for professional offices and for
"businesses which are incidental to the above professional prac-
tice, e.g., prescription shops, optical sales, etc."'44 Robert Lomi-
nick, a pharmacist, was interested in buying a lot in this zone for
the purpose of building and operating a drug store. He and his
attorney were concerned whether his business would be allowed
under this ordinance. Before acquiring the property Lominick
and his attorney had numerous conversations with the mayor,
city manager, and city attorney; and they submitted to the city
manager a formal request for a ruling. This request contained a
description of Lominick's proposed drug business in the follow-
ing langauge: "The primary business of the proposed structure
will be the selling and dispensing of prescription drugs and
hospital supplies. A small soda fountain sufficient in size to
accommodate ten (10) stools, will be located in the building. It
is contemplated that tobacco, magazines, and small gifts will
be sold." 45 The city attorney gave an opinion in writing to the
city manager to the effect that the proposed building and busi-
ness were proper under the ordinance and that a building permit
should be issued. Lominick then bought the lot on the strength
of this understanding, and applied to the building inspector for
a permit. The permit was duly issued. After the permit was is-
sued neighbors owning residences adjoining the property com-
plained to city council, which then, on a mere motion, voted to
revoke the permit. Lominick brought suit against the city of
Aiken and the neighbors to adjudicate his rights in the matter.
43. 244 S.C. 32, 135 S.E.2d 305 (1964).
44. Id. at 35, 135 S.E.2d at 306.
45. Id. at 36, 135 S.E.2d at 306.
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The zoning ordinance stated that any appeal from the issuance
of a building permit must be taken to the zoning board of ad-
justments, with further appeal to the court of common pleas.
Neither the neighbors nor the city had pursued this remedy and
therefore they now had no standing to challenge the building
permit. The motion passed by city council was a mere resolution
which could not amend or repeal the municipal zoning ordinance
under which the permit had been granted. The proper course
for the city was to have appealed the decision of the building
inspector to grant a building permit to the zoning board of ad-
justments. The case therefore presents the amusing spectacle of
a city which has lost in court because it failed to utilize and
exhaust its own administrative remedies. This case is reminiscent
of Willis v. Town of Woodruff46 where a building permit was
also improperly revoked as a consequence of the complaints of
neighboring property owners.
Eminent Domain Cases
The case of Sease v. City of Spartanlurg47 arose on demurrer.
The city of Spartanburg, the complaint alleged, was about to
take certain property from the plaintiff as a right of way for a
street, and as the street had been laid out, ingress and egress to
the plaintiff's remaining property through it would be denied.
The plaintiff alleged that the proposal of the city as to this
street was fantastic, unreasonable, unnecessary, uncalled for and
unwarranted. The legislature has delegated to municipalities the
power to determine when the exercise of eminent domain is
necessary. A determination by a municipality that it should ex-
ercise the power of eminent domain "is conclusive and is not sub-
ject to judicial review in the absence of fraud, bad faith, and
clear abuse of discretion." 48 The allegations that the proposal to
construct a street in the manner contemplated by the city was
fantastic, etc., were merely conclusions of the pleader and as such
were not admitted by the demurrer. The actual facts set forth
in the complaint were not sufficient to allege fraud, bad faith,
or clear abuse of discretion on the part of the city. The demurrer
was sustained. The court noted that deprivation of egress and
ingress would constitute a special injury to the plaintiff, and that
if this occurred the plaintiff would be entitled to special dam-
46. 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1940).
47. 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963)
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ages. Therefore the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy at
law and would not on this ground be entitled to the injunctive
relief which she sought in her complaint.
The case of Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter49 involves the
question of whether the city of Sumter could condemn for street
purposes a portion of the land owned by a charitable hospital.
Property already devoted to a public use cannot be taken for
some other public use in the absence of an appropriate expression
of legislative intent. Where the state itself is exercising the
power of eminent domain, this legislative intent may readily be
inferred. For example, power granted to the state highway de-
partment to condemn for highway purposes implies that it may
take property devoted to other public use.50 But in the case of
condemnation proceedings brought by municipalities, counties,
or public service corporations the general right to condemn does
not give rise to the implication that property devoted to some
other public use may be taken. Moreover, section 47-68.1 of the
Code," ' which grants to municipalities the right of condemnation,
expressly states, "this section shall not apply to any property
owned by public service corporations or devoted to public use."
In the case of County Bd. of Comm'rs of Clarendon County
v. Holliday12 the trustees of a church cemetery successfully re-
sisted condemnation by the county of a strip of land for road
purposes. The strip did not include any graves but appears to
have been a parking area.
On the other hand, in the case of Twin City Power Co. v.
Savannah River Elec. Co.,5 one power company was allowed
to condemn the land of another. In this case the Savannah
River Electric Company had been given the right to develop an
area along the river for production of power and had acquired
land for this purpose, but had sat on the property for a long
time without developing it. Twin City Power Company was
given a franchise to build a dam for power in the same area. The
court held that the grant of a franchise to the second company
would have been a futile act if this company could not condemn
the property already held in the same area by the first company
and found an expression of legislative intent allowing this con-
49. 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964).
50. Riley v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 238 S.C. 19, 118 S.E.2d 109
(1963).
51. S.C. CODE ANr. § 47-68.1 (1962).
52. 182 S.C. 510, 189 S.E. 185 (1937).
53. 163 S.C. 438, 161 S.E. 750 (1929).
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demnation. This decision was also based on the second ground
that property condemned or purchased for a public use but never
put to that use, is as freely subject to condemnation as property
of a private individual.
In the instant case the city of Sumter was certainly in no posi-
tion to claim that its authority to condemn property devoted to
other public use had been given by the legislature by express
terms or other necessary implication, such position being made
wholly untenable by the express terms of the statute referred to
above. This left the issue of whether the hospital property is in
fact devoted to a public use. The complaint alleged that the
hospital was an eleemosynary corporation operating a charitable
hospital under the provisions of the will of the late T. J. Tuomey
and that the property owned by the hospital is devoted to a
public use. The case was heard on a demurrer. The court pointed
out that the statement in the complaint that the property owned
by the hospital is devoted to a public use is an inference drawn
by the pleader from the facts or a conclusion of law and as such
was not admitted by the demurrer. The court remarked that the
question of whether the complaint alleged the public use of the
property is "a close one," but overruled the demurrer. Since the
court states that the mere allegation that the property is held by
an eleemosynary corporation and is devoted to charitable pur-
poses does not in itself show that the property is devoted to a
public use within the meaning of condemnation law, and since
the court holds that the statement in the complaint that the prop-
erty "is devoted to a public use" is an inference drawn by the
pleader or a conclusion of law, it is difficult to point to anything
in the decision which justified overruling the demurrer. In this
connection note the Sease case, supra. It would have been desir-
able for the complaint to have set out the factual elements of
public use, and anyone who may bring such a complaint in the
future would be well advised to do this.
The definitions of public use given by the court emphasize
that such use cannot be merely permissive, but that the public
must have a right in the property, independent of the owner's
pleasure. Do not leap to the conclusion that the definitions given
require that any member of the public at large may insist upon
the right to use the property. After all, a church cemetery is a
"public use," as is the right of way of a power company though
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to scattered customers . .. unless it would be remunerative." 54
The case of Willimon v. City of Greenville55 is another illus-
tration of the relative disability suffered by municipalities in
condemnation cases. In the Tuomey case it was seen that the limi-
tation of the power of eminent domain granted to municipalities
prohibits their condemnation of property held for public use.
In the Willimon case attention is called to the fact that the lia-
bilities of municipalities for damages are greater than those of
the state. Under section 47-1327 of the Code5" it has been held
that a city is liable to the landowner for damages caused to
property by alteration or change in grade of abutting streets,
although a change of grade is not "a taking" of property under
the constitution. A municipality is therefore liable to an abutting
property owner for damages resulting from a change of grade,
but the highway department is not liable. Cases on these points
are cited by the court in its opinion. Before 1951 municipalities
were responsible for state highways within city limits. Under the
Act of 195117 the State Highway Department was authorized to
give its attention to state highways within municipal limits, pro-
vided that all work performed by the highway department on
such highways would be with the consent and approval of proper
municipal authorities.
58
Under section 33-173 of the Code59 approval by the munici-
pality of work undertaken by the highway department "should
be understood to mean that the municipality thereby assumes all
liability which the department might otherwise have, etc." 60 In
the present case the grade of a state highway lying within the
Greenville city limits was altered in such a manner as to injure
the value of certain abutting property which was being used as
a filling station. The landowner made demand upon the city to
appoint appraisers in condemnation, but the city refused to do
so on the grounds that it had no liability for damages resulting
from the change of grade. The landowner then brought this pro-
ceeding for mandamus to compel the city to appoint the ap-
praisers.
54. Bookhart v. Electric Power Co-op., 219 S.C. 414, 65 S.E.2d 781 (1951).
55. 243 S.C. 82, 132 S.E.2d 169 (1963).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1327 (1962).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-112 (1962).
58. S.C. C DE ANN. § 33-172 (1962).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-173 (1962).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-123 (1962).
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The position of the city was that it had assumed, only the
liability of the highway department, under section 33-173 of the
Code. 61 Since a change of grade is not "a taking" under the con-
stitution, the highway department had no liability for the result-
ing damages. The landowner contended that section 33-173 and
other language in the 1951 Act merely fixed the liability of the
municipality and the highway department inter sese and did not
relieve the municipality from the consequences of section 47-
1327 of the Code. 2 The landowner contended that section
47-1327 still governed state highways within municipalities so
far as the rights of abutting property owners were concerned.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found for the landowner,
holding:
[W]e are of opinion that where a City authorizes and ap-
proves an improvement, construction, reconstruction or al-
teration by the Highway Department of a State Highway
within such municipality in addition to assuming all liabil-
ity which the Highway Department might otherwise have
as a result of such action under Section 33-173, Code of Laws
of South Carolina, 1962, the City will also be liable for such
damages arising therefrom as though it had performed the
work itself; ...6
The case of Jones 'v. Jones4 was an action brought by a hus-
band against a wife and against the South Carolina State Hos-
pital. The complaint alleged that the defendants had wrongfully
conspired to incarcerate the plaintiff in the South Carolina State
Hospital and had subjected him to shock treatments and con-
finement against his will.
The state hospital demurred on the grounds that as an agency
of the state it was immune from suit. The demurrer was allowed.
The plaintiff-appellant contended that since the constitution
provides for the payment of just compensation upon the taking
of private property for public use, and since his liberty and right
to work were a species of property, he was entitled to compensa-
tion for their taking. Whatever was taken from the plaintiff,
the taking was not for public use. The constitution provides for
the payment of just compensation only when the taking is for
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-173 (1962).
62. S.C. C(DE ANN. § 47-1327 (1962).
63. Willimon v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 82, 89, 132 S.E.2d 169, 172
(1963).
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public use, and if the taking is not for public use it is then a
mere tort. As to torts the state may assert its immunity from suit.
The case of South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Bolt65 con-
tains a lucid discussion of certain elements of damage in con-
demnation cases. The property of the landowner was used by
him for the operation of a successful chicken farm. A portion
of this property was taken for a non-access highway. The land-
owner showed that the noise from the traffic would adversely
affect the productivity of the chickens and that the location of
some of the chicken houses had become unsuitable. The land-
owner requested that the court instruct the jury that his loss of
business was an independent element of damage which should
be included in the just compensation due him.
The lower court correctly refused to charge the jury as re-
quested. The damages recoverable in a condemnation case are
limited to the value of the land actually taken and to any injury
resulting to the remaining property. Loss of business arising
from the taking is not a separate element of damage in the ab-
sence of a statute expressly allowing such damages. Injury to the
business use of the property may properly be considered in
determining the market value of the property before and after
the taking. Property which can be used in a successful commer-
cial enterprise is ordinarily more valuable than property which
cannot be so used. Therefore the landowner's loss of business
could be considered in determining whether or not the market
value of the remaining property had been affected by the taking,
but the loss of business itself could not be considered as a sep-
arate element of damage. While the landowner was entitled to
introduce evidence as to the market value of the buildings which
the condemnation had rendered unusable, he was correctly re-
fused the right to introduce testimony as to the cost of building
new chicken houses at another location.
Under section 33-217 of the Code66 it is provided that abutting
property owners along new non-access highways shall not be en-
titled to treat the denial of the right of access as grounds for
special damages. In the present case the court points out that
there are legitimate elements of damage arising from the pres-
ence of a non-access highway other than the mere denial of access
to the highway. The statutory restriction as to damages in this
instance does not cover the possible depreciation of the remain-
65. 242 S.C. 411, 131 S.E.2d 264 (1963).
66. S.C. CODM ANx. § 33-217 (1962).
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ing property by reason of the non-access character of the high-
way. Where a non-access highway divides a tract of land into
two portions, the fact that there is no access from one portion
to the other may be considered in computing severance damages.
The case of South Carolina Highway Dep't V. Sohrimpf6 T
holds that a landowner is not entitled to interest on a condemna-
tion award from the date of the verdict to the date of payment.
There is a dissent written by Mr. Justice Bussey, joined by Mr.
Justice Brailsford. This case involves detailed consideration of
the construction of certain statutes regarding the entry of judg-
ment. The dissent makes the less technical point that interest on
a deferred payment should be a part of the "just compensation"
required by the constitution. The considerations upon which the
majority opinion was based are remote from the law of property
and are therefore not discussed in this note.
In the case of South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Sharpeus
the attorney for the landowner in his opening argument to the
jury said, "You should be fair to the landowner, to the state
government, and to the federal government." 9 Counsel for the
highway department objected to the reference to the federal
government and counsel for the landowner then explained "It is
common knowledge that the federal government pays nine-tenths
of the verdict in these cases." 70 Counsel for the highway depart-
ment moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the remarks of
the landowner's counsel were prejudicial. It may be assumed
that the highway department was seeking a test case, since the
quoted remarks appear to have been well intended. In Johnson v.
South Carolina Highway Dep't71 evidence in a condemnation
case that the federal government was contributing to the cost of
a highway project was held to be inadmissible. It was inadmis-
sible because it had nothing to do with the issues. In the instant
case the court stated that "the Johnson case is authority for the
proposition that the argument or statements of counsel . . . were
improper.172 However, the court went on to find that while these
remarks were improper they were not as a matter of law preju-
dicial. The court refers to the recent Georgia case of State High-
67. 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E2d 44 (1963).
68. 242 S.C. 397, 131 S.E.2d 217 (1963).
69. Id. at 399, 131 S.E.2d at 258.
70. Id. at 399, 131 S.E.2d at 259.
71. 236 S.C. 424, 114 S.E.2d 591 (1960).
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way Dep't v. J. A. 'Worley 6 Co., 7 which held that disclosure of
federal participation in a highway project in a condemnation
case was not prejudicial. Despite the fact that mention of federal
funds in a condemnation case is not prejudicial as a matter of
law, and was found not to be prejudicial in the instant case,
the court unequivocally prohibits the bar from mentioning it in
argument. Reference to federal highway aid, the court stated,
"should be scrupulously avoided because it is quite possible for
such to be injected in such a manner as to constitute prejudice
and require the granting of a mistrial or a new trial."
74
The case of Woodfields, Inc. v. Gantt Water c Sewer Dist.
75
is a continuation of the litigation of Derby Hgt's, Inc. 'V. Gantt
'Water CC, Sewer Dist.7 6 This former case is of importance in the
law of eminent domain, but the present case was decided merely
on issues of fact, and the concurrent findings of the master and
the circuit judge were sustained by the supreme court.
Personal Property Cases
In Layton v. Flowers77 the court was asked to reconsider the
decision in Tate v. Brazier7" which holds that the defense of
bona fide purchaser for value without notice is not good against
an automobile collision lien under section 45-551 of the Code.
7 9
Since the Tate case was decided some forty years ago and since
the legislature has not seen fit to amend the attachment statute
to protect bona fide purchasers for value without notice, the
court regarded itself bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and
declined to reconsider the earlier decision. The automobile which
was attached in this case had been repaired after it had left the
hands of the tort-feasant owner. Immediately after the accident
the automobile was worth 350 dollars. The owner of the automo-
bile at the time of suit had bought it for 970 dollars. The collision
attachment lien was allowed only as to the value of the car at
the time of the wreck, the court holding:
73. 103 Ga. App. 25, 118 S.E.2d 298 (1961).
74. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Sharpe, 242 S.C. 397, 402, 131 S.E.2d
257, 260 (1963).
75. 243 S.C. 492, 134 S.E.2d 749 (1964).
76. 237 S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13 (1960).
77. 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E.2d 247 (1964).
78. 115 S.C. 283, 105 S.E. 413 (1920).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-551 (1962).
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PROPERTY SURVEYED
To allow respondent the benefit of the enhanced value would
reward him for his delay at the expense of an innocent per-
son. We find no impelling reason why this windfall must
be awarded respondent and hold that under the peculiar
facts of this case respondent's lien may be enforced against
the Chevrolet automobile in question only to the extent of
$350.00.80
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